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WOMEN AND LAW IN CLASSICAL GREECE.

Classical scholars never tire of reminding us that one must know
why a document was written before one can accurately interpret it.
Since most historical documents were intended to persuade, not to
provide unbiased evidence for future historians, a knowledge of who
was to be persuaded, and of what, can tell us whether an ancient
source should be taken at face value. The same caveat should also be
applied when reading modem works concerning the status of women
in the ancient world. The survival of only a small amount of direct
evidence makes scholarship of any aspect of ancient civilization difficult, since the scholar must of necessity make educated guesses about
vital but unknown facts in order to reconstruct the society. Looking
critically at the author's point of view is especially important for a
topic as politically charged as the status of women.
Women and Law in Classical Greece presents the undisputed outlines of the legal position of women in ancient Greece. The picture
drawn is bleak by modem standards. For example, in classical Athens, a woman's consent to marriage was not necessary (p. 33). A woman had no legal authority to handle transactions in property worth
more than a certain minimal amount, nor could she make a will (p.
37). Throughout her life, a woman was legally under the care of a
male guardian (kyrios) - her husband or her nearest male relative who handled nearly all legal transactions for her, including giving her
in marriage, providing a dowry, litigating on her behalf in the courts,
and handling all but the smallest monetary transactions (pp. 36-38,
154). Perhaps most shocking to modem readers are the rules governing an heiress (epikleros), the daughter of a man who died leaving
no sons. The heiress was by law given in marriage to her nearest male
relative, along with the property of the deceased (p. 29). If the male
relative (who might be as close in consanguinity as an uncle) was already married, he could divorce his wife and marry the heiress (p. 29).
The heiress was thus treated as part of the estate and went to the heir.
Given these restrictions, classical scholars agree that the status of
women in the ancient world (especially in classical Athens) was inferior to that of modem Western women. But they have long disagreed
on how modem society should interpret the historical evidence. Some
scholars argue that there was little connection between legal and social
status, and that classical women's social status was actually much
higher than a modem reading of the laws indicates. 1 Other scholars
1. See, e.g..

A. GOMME,

The Position of Women in Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries

1610
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concede the circumscribed social roles of women, but interpret the evidence to show that women still in many ways led full lives.2 Scholars
on the other side of the debate paint a much bleak.er picture of the life
of women in the ancient world. 3 This latter perspective, recently
taken up by feminist scholars, portrays Athenian women as having no
political or legal rights, and a social position scarcely distinguishable
from that of slaves.4
In evaluating these texts, the reader should take into account the
objectives of the various scholars. Much of feminist scholarship
desires to expose "the nearly universal and extraordinarily enduring
character of women's oppression,"5 which comes from a sexist ideology that "permeates our history and society."6 Scholarship pursued to
further this goal has two consequences. It may lead scholars to investigate areas traditionally ignored by classicists.7 But it may also color
conclusions drawn from ambiguous evidence, since scholarship showing the oppression of women as a permanent feature of Westem culture lends support to feminist assumptions. 8
On the other hand, the lack of an acknowledged political agenda
does not mean that traditional classical scholars are free from bias.
Even assuming political neutrality, one must recognize that these
scholars are persons who have found ancient civilizations worthy of a
lifetime of study. One would not expect to find many harsh critics of
classical civilization among their numbers. 9
B.C, in EssAYS IN GREEK HlsrORY AND LITERATURE 89 (1937). Professor Gomme gives as an
example the society of the Arabian Nights, in which "women have (practically) no legal rights
and are socially confined, yet are the equals of men," at least in matters of love. Id. at 90.
2. See, e.g., H. Krrro, THE GREEKS 232-35 (rev. ed. 1957) (noting that women were likely to
have gone to the theater and to have received some education in the home); W. LACEY, THE
FAMILY IN CLASSICAL GREECE 176 (1968) (Women "enjoyed a life not much narrower and not
much less interesting than women in comparable classes of society elsewhere.").
3. See, e.g., Gould, Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of Women in Classical Athens, 100 J. HELLENIC STUD. 38 (1980).
4. See, e.g., E. CANTARELLA, PANDORA'S DAUGHTERS (rev. ed. 1987); E. KEuLS, THE
REIGN OF THE PHALLUS (1985).
5. E. DUBOIS, G. KELLY, E. KENNEDY, C. KORSMEYER & L. ROBINSON, FEMINIST
SCHOLARSHIP 88 (1985).
6. Id. at 102.
7. Consider, for example, the comprehensive study of vase paintings that give evidence regarding male Greek sexual attitudes toward women in E. KEULS, supra note 4.
8. Scholarship demonstrating the oppression of women in classical Athens also serves other
goals. One author sees the exclusion of women's voices from public life in classical Greece as an
early example of the power of speech as an instrument of domination. See Elshtain, Feminist
Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power, and Meaning, in FEMINIST THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 127, 130-31 (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo & B. Gelpi eds. 1982).
9. For example, Professor Gomme's assertion that an unprejudiced reading of certain Greek
poets would not reveal "anything remarkable about the position of women in Athens except
perhaps the special honour paid to them,'' to the modem reader seems to be the product of
amazingly rosy inferences drawn from the evidence. A. GOMME, supra note 1, at 94. Professor
Keuls finds the roots of bias among traditional scholars in "the near-monopoly that men have
held in the field of Classics ... and ••. a misguided desire to protect an idealized image of
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Thus, both camps - feminist and traditional scholars - consider
ancient Greece to be a surrogate society for addressing contemporary
issues. Traditional scholars use ancient Athens and its dazzling accomplishments as an example of the heights to which a civilized society can rise and as a model to which modem society can aspire.
Feminist scholars, however, are just as determined to use Athens as a
different kind of model for the modem world - a model of an opulent
and cultivated society, like our own, that is ultimately based on the
oppression of women. The feminists believe that tarring Athens with
the same brush as modem society will better expose the faults of modem society. As expected, gaps in the historical record may be filled
very differently by these groups.
Professor Sealey, a historian at the University of California at
Berkeley, seems at first glance to fit into the party of traditional scholars. His earlier writings discuss ancient Greek political structures, not
the status of women. 1 Furthermore, in this volume he takes issue
with several inferences drawn by some feminist scholars (pp. 166-68),
which he considers to be overstatements of the legal disabilities of women in ancient Athens. Sealey implicitly asserts that these feminist
authors draw incorrect inferences because of their political biases. I I
On the other hand, the reader of Women and Law in Classical Greece
will find few signs of the ancient-civilization worship characteristic of
some traditional scholars. Moreover, Sealey directs his complaints
against wliat he considers these feminist scholars' poor scholarship,
not their politics. Thus, Sealey seems to occupy something of a middle
ground in the debate.
That women in ancient Greece faced a variety of legal disabilities is
uncontroversial. But the inferences Sealey draws from these uncontroversial facts (pp. 151-60) differ in many ways from those of both
the feminist scholars and earlier traditional scholars. In comparing
ancient Greek societies, Sealey finds the similarities of the laws more
important than the differences. One of these similarities is that women
had at least some limited legal rights. 12 He asserts that the legal disa-

°

Athens." E. KEuLS, supra note 4, at 1. Professor Pomeroy asserts that the traditional scholars'
admiration for the Athenians makes them "reluctant to believe that the Athenians might not
have treated their wives the way cultivated gentlemen in the twentieth century treat theirs." S.
POMEROY, GODDESSES, WHORES, WIVES, AND SLAVES: WOMEN IN CLAssICAL ANrlQUITY 59
(1975).
10. See, e.g., R. SEALEY, THE ATHENIAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY OR THE RULE OP LAw?
(1987); R. SEALEY, A HISrORY OP THE GREEK CITY STATES, CIRCA 700-338 B.C. (1976).
11. "A catalogue of errors soon becomes tedious, especially when they spring from a single
root. Let it suffice to say that feminist indignation is out of place in the study of ancient Greece."
P. 168.
12. For example, Sealey finds evidence in one Athenian forensic speech that women had the
power to draw up documents to record debts and to be witnesses to legal documents. Sealey
concludes that women were not always treated as passive objects, but that they had at least a
rudimentary legal personality. P. 40.
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bilities imposed on Greek women stem from two cultural standards
common to all ancient Greek societies: women's inability under
Greek customs to bear weapons and the Greeks' interest in protecting
the legal status of their citizens' children. He proposes that women's
inability to litigate for themselves stems from the origin of litigation as
a replacement for self-help - since women were incapable of self-help
without the aid of a man who could bear weapons, they were not allowed to use Greek society's replacement for self-help: litigation (p.
152). Sealey explains the lack of the need for a woman's consent to
marriage as a protection to the legitimacy of citizens' children. Since
Greek law severely disabled illegitimate offspring, the Greek city-state
was unwilling to invalidate a marriage on such trivial (to the Greeks)
grounds as the lack of consent of the parties. According to Sealey,
children, and the orderly inheritance of property by children, simply
mattered more to the Greeks than the legal rights of their wives (pp.
259-60). Sealey's explanations, although by no means an exoneration
of the mores of the ancient Greeks, offer quite a contrast to those of
Professor Keuls, a feminist scholar. She asserts that the Athenians,
alone among the ancients, attempted to establish nothing less than a
phallocracy - a rule of the phallus - and that the legal disabilities of
women necessarily resulted from that attempt. 13
Sealey reaches his conclusions after surveying the legal condition
of women of several Greek cities. This survey is unusual in several
respects. First, the author devotes a lengthy chapter to a comparison
of the law of ancient Gortyn, a rather obscure Cretan city, with the
better-known laws of the Athenians (pp. 50-81). Scholars' ip.terest in
Gortyn arises principally from the discovery in the nineteenth century
of a nearly complete fifth-century legal code inscribed on a wall (p.
50). Professor Sealey's elaborate analysis of the provisions of the
Gortynian Code relating to women gives crucial evidence regarding
the legal condition of women of the classical period in a city other
than Athens. Sealey also abandons the usual chronoiogical approach,
in which Homeric society is discussed first and Hellenistic society last.
He begins by discussing the society about which most is known ancient Athens (pp. 12-49) - and then proceeds to those about which
less and less is known- Gortyn (pp. 50-81), Sparta (pp. 82-88), Hellenistic cities (pp. 89-95), and finally Homeric Greece (pp. 110-50).
This device allows the narrative to flow more smoothly and puts off
the most speculative conclusions until the reader has acquired a more
sure foundation. The author also includes a chapter on the status of
women in the Roman world (pp. 96-109), which allows the reader to
make comparisons between the two cultures.
Although this is a historical study, not a legal text, much of the
material discussed will seem familiar to a lawyer without classical
13. E. KEuLS, supra note 4, at 1-2.
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training. Sealey relies on the usual source of Athenian law: the forensic speeches of the fourth century. Because these speeches were valued
as exemplars of rhetoric, not as legal documents, only one side of the
case is usually preserved, and the verdict is rarely known. 14 The lawyer will find reading Sealey's paraphrases of these speeches similar to
reading only one party's briefin a modem lawsuit. Sealey's analysis of
the Code of Gortyn will also seem familiar to modem lawyers as an
example of statutory interpretation.
Scholars of comparative law will be especially interested in this
volume. Sealey's discussions about the legal status of women in ancient Greece inevitably lead to more general discussions about Greek
law. For example, the reader learns in some detail the Greek system
of property and inheritance when reading about whether women could
be said to own property and whether they could devise or inherit it.
Despite this volume's considerable virtues, it suffers from two apparently conflicting vices: Professor Sealey knows both too little and
too much law. As a historian, rather than a lawyer, he sometimes
struggles with legal concepts and misses obvious parallels with the
common law that would be illuminating to a lawyer. On the other
hand, as a modem beneficiary of the 2500 years of legal development
since the height of classical Greece, he knows much more law (or at
least has quite a different understanding of the law) than the Greeks
whom he studies.
The first criticism, that the author knows too little law, is especially relevant to legally educated readers, who would benefit from
analogies to modem law. This criticism can best be illustrated by
looking at Sealey's treatment of a woman's dowry in Athenian law.
Customarily, the father of the bride supplied a dowry to go with his
daughter upon marriage (p. 26). Since women were unable to conduct
transactions for property worth more than a certain minimal value (p.
37), the husband administered the dowry (p. 26). The husband was
required to return the dowry, however, if the marriage ended and the
wife returned to her father's house (p. 26). Moreover, a husband's
creditors could not reach his wife's dowry (p. 26). Thus, the wife can
be viewed as having a property interest in the dowry, although she
could not directly control it (p. 48). This concept of attenuated ownership troubles Sealey, and he spends several pages deriving and differentiating theories of "positive" and "negative" ownership, the latter of
which apparently means no more than the right to exclude others
from the property (pp. 47-48). Since the dowry was excluded from all
except the husband, Sealey concludes that the wife had a negative
ownership interest in the property (p. 48). To a lawyer, of course, the
concept of ownership as a bundle of rights, one of which is the right to
14. See K. FREEMAN, THE MURDER OF HERODES AND OrHER TRIALS FROM THE ATHE·
NIAN LAW COURTS 14-30 (1946).
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exclude, is hardly novel and is certainly unworthy of lengthy explication. Furthermore, Sealey's description of the dowry is closely analogous to the common law concept of the equitable trust. 15 An analysis
of the similarities and differences between the Greeks' use of the
dowry and the equitable trust would have been helpful to lawyers. 16
On the other hand, the author's detailed legal analysis can be taken
as evidence that the author knows too much law, or at least has too
modem a conception of legal meaning. The dowry discussion again
provides a useful example. Professor Sealey's analysis of the laws pertaining to the dowry leads him to conclude that the purpose of the
laws was to require the husband to administer the dowry for the wife's
benefit. Such purposive analysis comes naturally even to those without legal training, so deeply embedded in the modem mind is this urge
to discover the legal principles behind statutes. But such theorizing
may be anachronistic in describing the Greek legal system, which
lacked the conceptual framework of modem systems.17 Classical
Greece, unlike ancient Rome and modem America, had no legal experts. Orators such as Lysias and Demosthenes, hired by the litigants
to write their speeches, were the closest equivalent; the orators, however, were experts in rhetoric, not law, and a litigant delivered the
orator's speeches to the jury himself. 18 The jurors heard the facts and
the law from the litigants and made up their minds. 19 The modem
practice of interpretation of statutes by judges or professors (or the
ancient Roman practice of interpretation by jurists) was unknown to
the Greeks. Thus, neither a legal expert nor any real legal analysis
stood between the Athenian code and the jury. The formal, systematic
thinking about the law that we take for granted apparently did not
take place in classical Athens. 2 0
Thus, it is unlikely that the dowry laws had a single overarching
purpose behind them - many contradictory purposes probably existed simultaneously, with no one controlling. No doubt a clever litigant could have argued that the purpose of the dowry statutes was to
provide support for the wife. But the opposing litigant could have
permuted the same or related statutes into a contradictory theory say, that the dowry was an enticement from the woman's family to
15. According to Sealey, an Athenian woman was owner of her dowry because "[o]ther persons .•. were not allowed access to her property, but her kyrios [her husband or other male
guardian] ..• had authority to administer her property for the specific purpose of her upkeep and
the protection of her interests." P. 48. The husband seems similar to a trustee in this analysis,
and the wife, an equitable owner.
16. Another parallel from the common law, equally ignored in the text, is the early English
practice of entailing land given to a daughter to protect her from the unfettered discretion of her
husband. See A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 209 (2d ed. 1986).
17. See J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 113 (1968).
18. See K. FREEMAN, supra note 14, at 17-20.
19. Id. at 20.
20. See J. DAWSON, supra note 17, at 113-14.

1616

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1610

induce the man to marry. Who was to say which theory represented
the true statutory purpose? With no restraint on the jury from legal
professionals who might impose an accepted interpretation or who
might refuse to allow the action, the interpretation of every litigant
would have a chance of being accepted by the jury. And every jury
verdict would be equally valueless to the next jury. A statutory purpose is meaningless in such a system.
This modem tendency to assume that deep principles underlie statutes may be considered a bias, more subtle than the political biases
discussed earlier, but similarly harmful in effect. This bias will cause a
scholar to impose order where none, or little, really exists. Sealey is
doubtless aware of the inherently unformed nature of classical Greek
law. But because he does not take care to distinguish between Greek
law and his legal analysis of it, he runs the risk of confusing the modem reader, who might suppose that his analysis is simply a rediscovery
of what the Greeks themselves actually thought.
Sealey is more successful in making useful comparisons between
Greek and Roman law. Since early Roman and Greek societies
evolved under similar economic conditions, he believes that differences
in the legal status of women must spring from something particular to
the societies (p. 96). Sealey asserts that the laws of the Greeks had an
underlying unity: women in ancient Greece were always under the
authority of a kyrios (a male guardian or master). This power might
be transferred from a father to a brother or other male relative, but
every woman was subject to the authority of a kyrios throughout her
life (p. 107). By contrast, male authority over women in Roman society varied from almost complete control to no more than a formal
ability to ratify women's wishes, depending on the legal relationship
between the man in authority and the woman under his power. 21
Thus, the legal disabilities imposed by the Greeks were generally
common to all Greek societies, but different from the disabilities imposed by the Romans. Professor Sealey considers this to be evidence
that the disabilities imposed by the Greeks came from the common
sources in Greek culture described above - women's inability to bear
arms and the Greeks' overriding concern for their children's legitimacy. 22 By contrast, the legal disabilities of Roman women came
from the patriarchal structure of Roman families, with the father
wielding enormous power over all his lineal descendents, both male
21. For example, a daughter was subject to patria potestas (p. 107), which gave her father
nearly unlimited power, including the power to put her to death (p. 98). But a woman who had
become independent (sui iurus) was subject only to tutela - the control of her tutor (p. 107)whose function was to give formal ratification of the woman's legal transactions (p. 105). Since
in later Roman law, the woman had the power to choose her own tutor (p. 105), his control must
have been very mild indeed, or she would have got rid of him. Patria potestas and tute/a were
both restrictions on the legal capacity of women, but they had little else in common.
22. See supra notes 12·13 and accompanying text.
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and female. When this power was no longer threatened (for example,
when the father died), the Romans more readily allowed greater liberty to children of both sexes. Thus, the power of the father in Roman
society was ironically a source of some equality between the sexes (p.
158).
Overall, this book is well-written and engaging.23 It is a scholarly
work, however, and Sealey assumes at least a modest knowledge of
classical civilization and an interest in following his close reasoning.
One learns little of the general form of Athenian democracy, for example, which is important for making sense of the laws he discusses.
Someone looking for a general overview of either the law or the status
of women in ancient Greece will do better to look elsewhere.24 Sealey
is generous with his source material, giving detailed synopses of Athenian forensic speeches and the Gortynian Code. The level of detail of
his analysis demands close attention from the reader, but in the end
the reader is rewarded either by being more firmly persuaded or by
being made fully aware of the limitations of the analysis.
Sealey has accomplished the difficult task of avoiding the excesses
of both the feminist and the traditional scholars. His conclusions are
well-reasoned and objective; his inferences appear to be drawn neither
from a personal disdain for the Greeks' treatment of women nor from
an overzealous worship of their culture. Even feminist scholars who
are unpersuaded by Sealey's conclusions would do well to test their
own theories against the analysis of ancient law provided in this wellwritten volume.

-Craig Y. Allison

23. I have one quibble over orthography. Sealey follows the pernicious innovation of Hellenizing the spelling of common Greek proper names which are better known to Westerners in
their Latin form (e.g., Sokrates, Perikles, and Klytaimestra). Using these less familiar spellings
distracts the reader from the writing in much the same way as writing "night" phonetically as
"nite." Cf. W. STRUNK & E. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 74-75 (3d ed. 1979). It also
insinuates into the mind of the lay reader the unlovely thought that the author is showiilg us that
he knows how to read Greek.
24. See, e.g., S. POMEROY, supra note 9; K. FREEMAN, supra note 14.

